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Search theory suggests that early career job changes on balance lead to better matches that benefit
both workers and firms, but this may not hold in teacher labor markets characterized by salary rigidities,
barriers to entry, and substantial differences in working conditions that are difficult for institutions
to alter. Of particular concern to education policy makers is the possibility that teacher turnover adversely
affects the quality of instruction in schools serving predominantly disadvantaged children. Although
such schools experience higher turnover on average than others, the impact on the quality of instruction
depends crucially on whether it is the more productive teachers who are more likely to depart. The
absence of direct measures of productivity typically hinders efforts to measure the effect of turnover
on worker quality. In the case of teachers, however, the availability of matched panel data of students
and teachers, enables the isolation of the contributions of teachers to achievement despite the complications
of purposeful choices of families, teachers, and administrators. The empirical analysis reveals that
teachers who remain in their school tend to outperform those who leave, particularly those who exit
the Texas public schools entirely. Moreover, this gap appears to be larger for schools serving predominantly
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Policy discussions of teacher quality typically highlight the institution of tenure, barriers 
to entry into the profession, salary rigidities, seniority rules, and the importance of working 
conditions associated with school location and demographic composition to distinguish teacher 
labor markets from other occupations with fewer labor market rigidities. The unique structure of 
teacher labor markets is often thought to contribute to high early career turnover in schools 
serving disadvantaged populations  and  to impede efforts to raise the quality of education.  Quite 
generally, turnover per se is thought to be bad, and exiting teachers are thought to be the more 
productive. These concerns stand in stark contrast to much of labor search theory, where early 
career turnover provides a mechanism for improving job matches that benefits both workers and 
firms. It may be that teacher labor markets lead to different outcomes, but it may also be the case 
that the concerns regarding turnover are misplaced.  This paper provides direct evidence about 
the impacts of school job matching on productivity and student achievement. 
Although teacher labor markets may be structured differently from other occupations, 
high turnover is certainly not a distinguishing feature.  The data suggest that exit rates from 
teaching mirror those in non-teaching occupations (Stinebrickner (2002), Ballou and Podgursky 
(2002)). Consequently, disproportionate harm from the turnover of teachers must come from the 
character of that turnover rather than simply the level, and there remains little evidence on 
productivity differences between teachers who transition out of a school and those that remain.  
In this paper we investigate the effects of turnover on the quality of instruction in a large 
urban district in Texas. The absence of direct measures of productivity typically hinders efforts 
to measure the effect of turnover on worker quality apart from the use of wage changes as an   2 
indirect proxy for changes in productivity. However, the availability of matched panel data of 
students and teachers enables the estimation of teacher quality based on the impact on student 
achievement.  This outcome-based productivity measure provides important information on the 
effects of turnover and the desirability of particular public policies designed to improve the 
quality of instruction in public schools broadly and more specifically in low achieving schools 
with high concentrations of disadvantaged and minority students. 
The next section briefly reviews theories of job turnover and empirical evidence on 
turnover and wage changes and then considers ways in which the unique aspects of teacher labor 
markets may or may not lead teacher turnover to be particularly costly to schools. Section II 
develops the empirical model used to measure teacher productivity based on test scores that 
provide imprecise measures of achievement.  This section highlights the difficulties introduced 
by the purposeful choices of families, teachers, and administrators and develops an approach to 
overcoming these impediments to identification. 
The subsequent two sections present the results of the empirical analyses. Section III 
reports a series of estimates of the variation in productivity for a large urban school district in 
Texas based on specifications that progressively take more and more steps to protect against bias 
introduced by matching of students and teachers in classrooms.
1
                                                 
1 For other estimates of teacher value-added, see  Hanushek (1971, 1992), Armor et al. (1976),Murnane (1975),  
Murnane and Phillips (1981), Aaronson, Barrow, and Sander (2007),Rockoff (2004), Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain 
(2005), Boyd et al. (2006), and Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger (2008). 
 The potentially unique aspects 
of teacher labor markets are easiest to see by tracking the job transitions of teachers, and Section 
IV investigates productivity differences between stayers and those in distinct mobility streams:  
moving to a new school in the same district, switching districts, and exiting the public schools 
entirely. This section also examines differences by average student achievement or demographic 
composition in the origin and destination schools, both because policy is concerned with the   3 
impacts of turnover on specific demographic groups and because the school population has 
implications for working conditions and the job demands on teachers. Finally, we also 
investigate whether teacher performance immediately prior to the transition could reflect 
temporary shocks in productivity rather than more permanent differences in quality. 
Section V summarizes the findings and discusses implications for public policy given the 
institutional structures within which public schools currently operate. Even though the employer 
is a public agency with considerable latitude for action on its own, it is generally concluded that 
new public policy interventions are required to improve educational outcomes. The correct 
policy, however, requires a clearer understanding of teacher labor markets in general and the 
dynamics associated with teacher turnover. 
I.    Employee Turnover and Firm Matching 
Economists have done considerable work on job search and mobility, and on first blush 
the public school teacher turnover appears to be similar to that of the typical young U.S. worker 
who changes jobs frequently early in the career. Most matching models posit that this turnover 
constitutes a productive component of the job search process.  Topel and Ward (1992) show that 
job changes account for a substantial share of early career wage growth, which is consistent with 
the belief that job changes tend to lead to better matches that enhance worker productivity.
2
Turnover can exact a cost to firms in the form of additional hiring expenses or the loss of 
 
Indeed, the flexibility and fluidity of American labor markets is often cited as one of the 
strengths of the U.S. economy as distinct from, say, European economies.  These arguments raise 
the question of whether teacher turnover actually imposes substantial costs on schools in general 
and those serving disadvantaged children in particular.  
                                                 
2 Burdett (1978) and Jovanovic (1979a, 1979b) offer alternative conceptions of the job search process.    4 
job specific human capital.  But, it is not clear that elementary and secondary school teaching fits 
the description of a job characterized by particularly high turnover costs.  Direct hiring costs for 
teachers appear to be modest.  It could be that coordination among teachers in terms of 
curriculum and other factors requires substantial investment in school specific knowledge, 
though that also seems unlikely.  
Two structural differences between teacher labor markets and other markets for 
professionals may raise the costs of teacher turnover.  First, rigidities in district salary and job 
promotion scales typically prevent efforts to reward more productive teachers.  These rigidities 
would appear to be magnified by limited salary differences among districts. In contrast, private 
firms tend to use much more flexible job categorization and salary determination processes. 
Second, because of early determination of tenure in many districts – sometimes by the end of the 
first or second year of employment, teachers exert substantial control over whether job matches 
persist.
3
These features of public schools may generate substantial turnover costs for schools 
serving disadvantage populations. If such schools have difficulty attracting teachers with prior 
experience, they may have difficulty replacing the general human capital acquired through initial 
experience. Contract provisions in many large urban districts specify that experience moves a 
teacher up the queue for vacant jobs, and this often leads to a concentration of rookie teachers in 
the highest poverty schools. A high share of teachers with little or no experience may hinder 
efforts to improve and align curriculum, mentor new teachers, and advocate for the school. In 
addition, more appealing outside job opportunities for highly skilled teachers may lead to the 
  Third, collectively bargained contracts for teachers frequently govern within district 
mobility and employment rights, granting mobility options based on seniority. 
                                                 
3 In 2008, ten states granted teacher tenure in one or two years of employment; only seven states had probationary 
periods greater than three years (National Council on Teacher Quality (2008)).   5 
disproportionate departure of more effective teachers. 
Existing evidence shows that teachers who switch schools tend to move to schools with 
higher achieving, higher income, and fewer minority students than their previous schools, and 
those changing districts tend to get slightly higher wages on average once the wages are adjusted 
for changes in student demographic composition.
4
The generalizability of these findings about mobility patterns is unclear, however.  
Podgursky, Monroe, and Watson (2004) and Scafidi, Sjoquist, and Stinebrickner (2006) find that 
the majority of exiting teachers from public schools do not move to higher paying jobs outside of 
teaching but instead are more likely either to exit the labor market entirely or switch to a lower 
paying job in a private school.  This pattern is consistent with the observation by Stinebrickner 
(2002) that much of the occupational movement by teachers is related to family circumstances – 
something that bears no clear relationship to job effectiveness. 
 Since demographic composition is likely to be 
related to working conditions, these findings suggest that non-pecuniary considerations tend to 
outweigh salary in job decisions of teachers. Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff (2005) also 
find that teacher labor markets tend to be highly localized, which further disadvantages high 
poverty, lower achieving schools located in urban centers and rural areas that tend to produce 
few college graduates. Moreover, evidence that teacher exit probabilities are higher for those 
with better alternative earning opportunities or more education (Dolton and van der Klaauw 
(1995, 1999)) supports the belief that leavers are drawn from higher up the quality distribution.   
The overall implications of observed teacher movements on the distribution of teacher 
quality are nonetheless difficult to infer. Although salary changes provide indirect information 
                                                 
4 Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff (2002),  Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2004), and Scafidi, Sjoquist, and 
Stinebrickner (2007) find that working conditions as measured by student demographic composition tends to be a 
more important determinant of school choice than salaries. Average salary changes following a move adjusted for 
working conditions are positive but small.   6 
on productivity in fluid labor markets, they likely provide little information in more rigid teacher 
labor markets. Moreover, individual salaries provide little information about differences in 
teacher productivity given the rigid salary structures, whose typical determinants – teacher 
education, teacher experience, or certification status – appear to explain little of the observed 
differences in effectiveness (Hanushek and Rivkin (2006)). 
Given the absence of direct information on the effectiveness of school leavers, the 
conflicting elements of existing research makes it far from clear how high turnover affects the 
quality of instruction in high poverty, low achieving schools. In fact teaching jobs appear to fit 
the description of “experience goods” (Jovanovic (1979b)) in that neither teachers nor schools 
have good information about teacher quality prior to arrival at the school. If knowledge acquired 
about productivity in the first years at a school disproportionately leads to separations of less 
effective teachers – either because they are counseled out or because they find low performance 
personally unsatisfying, then negative selection out of high poverty schools may partially, fully, 
or even more than fully offset any costs of turnover. Since the match response of principals and 
districts is muted, the decision making of individual teachers is likely to dominate the transition 
process, and the resulting distribution of teacher quality is uncertain. 
II.  Measurement of Teacher Effectiveness 
By necessity, understanding the character and implications of teacher job mobility begins 
with the development of measures of teacher quality, a requirement sidestepped when 
competitive forces are presumed to make salaries a sufficient statistic for quality. 
The primary analytical tasks are the separation of teacher contributions to achievement 
from other student, family, school, and community factors and the mitigation of sampling error 
introduced by the imperfections of the achievement measures. In terms of the separation of   7 
teacher contributions to achievement from those of other factors, we focus on accounting for 
student heterogeneity and differences in school factors in a specification built on a cumulative 
model of learning. Within this context, we discuss the advantages and drawbacks of specific 
methods for accounting for student and school differences. 
A number of studies highlight the fact that random test measurement error inflates 
estimates of the variance of teacher value-added in addition to introducing noise into the 
estimation of teacher contributions to learning (e.g., Gordon, Kane, and Staiger (2006), 
McCaffrey, Lockwood, Louis, and Hamilton (2004), and McCaffrey, Sass, Lockwood, and 
Mihaly (2009a)). Other work focuses on the effects of nonrandom aspects of measurement error 
including problems introduced by attempts to compare students in different parts of the 
achievement distribution. Hanushek, Kain, O'Brien, and Rivkin (2005) show that transformation 
of the value-added measure such that it captures value-added relative to other students from the 
same portion of the achievement distribution has little impact on estimates of the variance in 
teacher quality; we therefore focus on the mitigation of random test error. 
A. Cumulative Model of Learning 
Equation (1) models achievement of student i in grade G and year y (suppressed in the 
equation since year is unique to grade G for student i) as a function of initial student skill at entry 
to grade G (αiG), of family background and other influences outside of schools (X), of peer 
composition (P), of school factors – including resources, principal quality, and school or district 
determined curriculum (S), teacher quality (τ ), and of a random error (e).    
(1)  iG iG iG iG iG jy iG A X PS e αβ λ δ τ = + + + ++  
Teacher productivity may vary over time and is estimated in a semi-parametric manner by 
netting out the contributions of αiG, X, P, and S from the achievement of students taught by a   8 
teacher in a given year. 
In the absence of random assignment, unobserved peer and school factors for a given 
class could confound estimates of the quality of the teacher assigned to that class. The problems 
can come from a variety of behavioral outcomes including: principal assignment of better 
teachers to classrooms with less disruptive students (or more disruptive students, if seeking to 
equalize the quality of education across classes); the gravitation of better teachers toward higher 
resource schools; the movement of families with strong educational investment motivation to 
school districts with the best teachers and most extensive school programs. All complicate the 
estimation of teacher value-added to achievement, as teacher quality becomes intertwined with 
characteristics of students or schools. 
Accounting for student heterogeneity is a crucial component of the identification of 
teacher quality. We model α in a one dimensional framework in which differences in cognitive 
skills are assumed to evolve over time with experiences at home, in school, and in the 
community in a manner consistent with Equation (1). Equation (2) describes a reasonably 
general formulation of this cumulative process,  
(2) 
1 1 11 1
1 1 11 1
()
G G GG G
Gg Gg Gg Gg Gg
iG iG iG iG jy i i
g g gg g
X PS α βθ λθ δθ θτ γ θγ
− − −− −
− − −− −
= = == =
= + + + ++ ∑ ∑ ∑∑ ∑  
where i γ  is “innate ability”, which is assumed to affect learning in each period.
5
A good teacher likely raises achievement in the current year and subsequent years by 
increasing the stock of knowledge, and a supportive parent does the same. In a very general way, 
we allow historical effects (and knowledge) to depreciate at a geometric rate (1- θ) meaning that 
a teacher or peer’s effect on test scores diminishes with time such that a good 4
th grade teacher 
 
                                                 
5 Innate ability here simply refers to student differences set before entry to school that affect student learning growth 
and could arise from any combination of health, nutrition, genetic, or family factors.   9 
has a larger effect on 4
th grade score than on 5
th grade score.
6  If θ=1, the effects of prior 
experiences persist fully into the future, while, if θ=0, prior experiences and knowledge have no 
effect on current achievement. In the estimation, however, we do not constrain the knowledge 
depreciation rate to a specific value but instead directly estimate it.
7
  A value-added regression of achievement in grade G on achievement in grade G-1 along 
with contemporaneous family, school, and peer characteristics and a fixed effect for each teacher 




 (3)  
 Rewriting equations (1) and (2) for grade G-1 illustrates how the 
inclusion of AiG-1 as an explanatory variable with parameter θ in a regression with achievement in 
grade G as dependent variable potentially controls for the full set of historical factors. 
1 () iG iG i iG iG iG jy i iG AA X PS e θ γβ λ δ τ γ − = ++ + + + + +  
 The estimation presumes that there are at least two observations of achievement for each student 
and that there are multiple students with each teacher.   
B. Estimation of Teacher Value-added 
Whether the model generates unbiased estimates of the jy τ and the variance in teacher 
quality depends importantly on whether the empirical specification accounts for relevant factors 
affecting schools that are also correlated with the teachers or other inputs. The inclusion of prior 
achievement mitigates bias from omitted family, neighborhood, and school influences.  Yet this 
                                                 
6 This does not exhaust the possibilities that have been used, since using the difference in scores between grades G 
and G-1 as the dependent variable (i.e., imposing the assumption of θ=1) is sometimes accompanied by including 
student fixed effects. As Rivkin (2005) demonstrates, when θ<1, the gains specification will tend to bias downward 
differences among teachers in the absence of student fixed effects and bias upward differences among teachers if 
student fixed effects are included. 
7 For ease of estimation, we do constrain knowledge to depreciate at the same rate regardless of source.  In other 
words, past knowledge has the same impact on the accumulation of new knowledge, regardless of the source of this 
past knowledge.  Implicitly, this formulation does not allow for the “one special teacher” who has a lasting effect on 
student learning over and above the contemporaneous effect on achievement.   Jacob, Lefgren, and Sims (2008) 
consider alternative specifications of the dynamics with attention to varying persistence of teacher effects. 
8 See Hanushek (1979, 1986) for a discussion of value-added models.   10 
is generally insufficient because dynamic behavioral choices by families, teachers, and school 
authorities may induce correlations with teacher quality and thus may introduce bias even to 
value-added models. Moreover, when achievement is captured by standardized tests, test 
measurement error will inflate estimates of the teacher quality variance, even in the case where 
the teacher quality estimates are unbiased. 
Equation (4), in which the estimated fixed effect for teacher j is interpreted as the sum of 
the persistent component of teacher quality and an error term,  jy ν , provides a simple framework 
for examination of these issues and the assumptions that must be satisfied to produce unbiased 
estimates of both individual teacher fixed effects and the variance in teacher value-added. 
(4)   jy jy jy ν τ τ + = ˆ  




jy f unmeasured student classroom composition and school factors
nonpersistent teacher effects and test measurement error
ν =
 
Note that the test measurement error incorporates both elements of test reliability (consistency 
across time) and test validity (accuracy of measurement of desired dimensions). 
  Consider first the case where the correlation between persistent teacher quality and the 
error components (including nonpersistent teacher effects) equals zero.
9
jy τ
 In this case the estimates 
of teacher value-added, , are unbiased, while the sample variance of the teacher fixed effects 
equals the sum of the true variance and the variance of the other terms. Therefore an estimate of 
the variance in teacher value-added must be adjusted for these error components.  
  Many researchers have used an empirical Bayes shrinkage estimator to produce a 
                                                 
9 We generally focus on persistent differences in teacher quality, but for some purposes it is appropriate to consider 
both persistent and nonpersistent quality.  The sum is, for example, a reflection of the quality faced by students in 
any particular year.  Evidence suggests that teachers improve substantially in the first few years of their careers, and 
personal difficulties, the birth of children, and experimentation with new pedagogies all lead to variation over time 
in effectiveness.   11 
consistent estimate of the true variance in teacher quality, while an alternative approach is to use 
the adjacent year correlation among the teacher-by-year fixed effects for the same teacher to 
estimate the true variance.
10
(6) 
 Equation 6 is the simple correlation of estimated teacher fixed 
effects for adjacent years y and y-1.   
( )
1/2
11 12 cov( , )/ var( )var( ) yy y y r ττ τ τ −− =     
 
  If the errors in equation 4 are orthogonal across years, the covariance between adjacent 
year fixed effects equals the variance of true value-added.  In addition, if the variance in 












Therefore, multiplication of the estimated sample variance of τ   by the year-to-year correlation 
produces a direct estimate of the variance in true teacher quality that accounts for test error and 
nonpersistent differences in classroom average student quality, either purposeful or random. 
Now consider the case where the correlation between the error components and persistent 
teacher quality does not equal zero. Violation of the assumption that value-added is orthogonal to 
the remaining error components may introduce positive or negative bias depending upon the 
nature of both student and teacher sorting among schools and classroom assignment. In this case 
the covariance across adjacent years equals the sum of the variance in quality, the variance in the 
persistent components of the error term such as unobserved peer quality, principal effectiveness, 
or student skill, plus the relevant covariance terms. The methods described above would not 
                                                 
10 Empirical Bayes or shrinkage estimators move the separate estimates toward the mean according to the variance 
of the estimated parameter (e.g., Sanders and Horn (1994), Gordon, Kane, and Staiger (2006)). Aaronson, Barrow, 
and Sander (2007), Rockoff (2004), and others use estimates of the error variance for the teacher fixed effects to 
adjust raw fixed effect estimates.   12 
purge the estimates of these latter variance and covariance terms. 
Because available data typically have limited controls for differences in the quality of 
administration and other subtle aspects of schools such as the degree to which the curriculum and 
state standards align, it is quite difficult to separate teacher and school effects in specifications 
that produce teacher fixed effects relative to all other teachers in the district. Therefore, it is 
appealing to include school or even school-by-grade-by-year fixed effects in order to account for 
both observed and unobserved grade–by-year specific differences among schools and districts, 
recognizing though that this approach prohibits comparisons of teacher quality among schools. 
Yet even value-added estimates of teacher effectiveness based solely on within school 
variation could suffer from omitted variables bias if classroom assignments are not random. 
Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor (2006) and Rothstein (2010) document the existence of extensive 
within-school sorting on the basis of student characteristics and prior performance in North 
Carolina. Whether such sorting introduces substantial bias in commonly used value-added 
models is a topic of considerable debate. In an influential article, Rothstein (2010) argues that 
much of the sorting occurs on the basis of time varying student heterogeneity, and therefore 
lagged test scores and even student fixed effects may fail to capture important determinants of 
classroom allocation.
11
                                                 
11 Some specification issues do raise questions about the strength of this critique. The evidence that time varying 
classroom heterogeneity is important is based on findings from models with student fixed effects and test score gain 
as the dependent variable. If the assumption of no knowledge depreciation is incorrect, it could appear that much 
student heterogeneity was time varying even if that were not the case. 
 To provide an estimate of the potential importance of such selection, 
Kane and Staiger (2008) develop a specification test of the validity of non-experimental 
estimates for a small sample of Los Angeles teachers and cannot reject unbiasedness of various 
standard estimators. However, a lack of power inherent in such specification tests and potentially 
select nature of the sample introduce questions about the generalizability of the findings.   13 
  Given the difficulty of quantifying all relevant student and school variables related to the 
matching of students and teachers both within and between schools and the limitations of the 
specification tests employed, we adopt an alternative approach to circumvent bias introduced by 
purposeful sorting into classrooms. We begin by dividing school, grade, and year cells into 
“sorted” and “not-sorted” categories on the basis of two different dimensions of the classroom 
allocation process. Specifically, we examine whether there are either 1) significant differences in 
mean prior test score among classrooms based on an F- test
12
These tests are weak in the sense that the failure to reject the hypotheses of independence 
or no significant difference in mean prior test score at the five percent level does not provide 
strong evidence that a school randomly assigns students. Therefore, we augment these tests with 
falsification tests of the effects of future teachers on current achievement and specification tests 
related to assumptions about the rate of learning depreciation that we apply below.  We believe 
that the combined evidence supports the conclusion that the sample of schools for which 
common selection mechanisms are not obviously employed provides estimates of teacher effects 
that are not significantly contaminated by classroom composition. 
; or 2) whether the allocation of 
students across classrooms in grade g is independent of the allocation in grade g-1 based on a 
chi-squared test of the transition matrix. All classrooms in the school-grade-year cell are placed 
in the “purposefully sorted” category based on the particular test if the hypothesis of no 
significant differences (in the case of method 1) or independence (in the case of method 2) is 
rejected at the five percent level. Otherwise they are placed in the “not-sorted” category. 
III. Texas Schools Project Data 
The stacked panel datasets constructed by the Texas Schools Project contain 
administrative records collected by the Texas Education Agency (TEA) from the 1989-1990 
                                                 
12 This test is similar in spirit to that used by Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor (2006).   14 
through the 2001-2002 school years.
13
The student background data contain a number of student, family, and program 
characteristics including race, ethnicity, gender, and eligibility for a free- or reduced-price lunch 
(the measure of economic disadvantage), classification as special needs, and classification as 
limited English proficient. Students are annually tested in a number of subjects using the Texas 
Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS), which was administered each spring to eligible students 
enrolled in grades three through eight.  These criterion referenced tests evaluate student mastery 
of grade-specific subject matter, and this paper presents results for mathematics. Test scores are 
converted to z-scores using the mean and standard deviation for the entire state separately for 
each grade and year to account for effects of test score inflation and other changes to the tests. 
 The data permit the linkage of students over time and of 
students and teachers in the same school, grade, and year. The statewide data do not match 
students and classroom teachers, but such matches have been provided for a single large Texas 
urban district, known henceforth as “Lone Star” District. Typically this match identifies a subject 
specialist in middle school (a mathematics teacher here) and a general teacher in elementary 
school. Only regular classroom teachers are included in the analysis. 
  In this paper we study students and teachers in grades 4 through 8 for the school years 
1995-1996 to 2000-2001.  We eliminate any student without valid test scores or other missing 
data and classrooms with fewer than five students with non-missing data. 
IV. Estimation of the variance in teacher quality 
A basic starting point for the analysis of teacher transitions and related policies is the 
magnitude of variation in teacher quality. If variation is limited, concerns about turnover and its 
                                                 
13 The underlying data were developed at the Texas Schools Project at the University of Texas at Dallas.  For more 
detail, see http://www.utdallas.edu/research/tsp-erc/.   15 
impact on the distribution of teacher quality become less relevant. 
Our estimates of the variation in teacher quality are based on alternative specifications of 
equation (3). We compare teachers both to all teachers in the Lone Star district and, because of 
concerns about the selection of schools by both parents and teachers, to just the set of teachers in 
their own school, grade and year. To investigate the implications of any nonrandom sorting of 
students across classrooms, we compute separate estimates for “sorted” and “not-sorted” samples 
based on the statistical tests described above. 
A.  Basic Estimates of the Variance of Teacher Quality  
Table 1 reports a series of estimates of the variance of teacher-by-year fixed effects, the 
adjacent year correlation of estimated fixed effects for the same teacher, and the measurement 
error adjusted estimate of the variance in teacher quality. The first and second columns use both 
within- and between-school variation (i.e., compare teachers across the entire district), while the 
third and fourth use only within-school-grade-year variation, thus restricting comparisons to 
colleagues in the same school, grade, and year.  In addition, the second and fourth specifications 
regression-adjust for differences in observable student characteristics including eligibility for 
free or reduced lunch, gender, race and ethnicity, grade level, limited English proficiency, special 
education, student mobility status, and year dummy variables. 
A comparison of the estimated variance across columns indicates the potential 
importance of factors correlated with classroom differences in achievement. Controlling for 
observable student characteristics and using only the variation within school, grade, and year 
noticeably reduces the estimated variance in teacher value-added from the least restrictive 
specification.  As expected given that most sorting occurs among schools, the included student 
characteristics have a much larger effect in specifications not restricted to within-school-grade-  16 
year comparisons (columns 1 and 2 versus columns 3 and 4).  
  The second row reports the adjacent year correlations in estimated teacher value-added.  
The magnitudes range from 0.24 to 0.35, indicating that roughly a fourth of the overall variance 
and slightly more than one third of the within-grade variance is persistent.  These year-to-year 
correlations are similar to those found by others.
14
  The final two rows report estimates of the variance and standard deviation (
  Again the controls for student heterogeneity 
reduce the correlations less in the within-school-and-year specifications. Note that this does not 
have to be the case since some of the year-to-year variation in student gains comes from random 
differences in student characteristics, meaning that the inclusion of controls for student 
heterogeneity could potentially increase the adjacent year correlation. 

τ σ ) of true 
teacher value-added (based on equation (7)). Because the student test scores are normalized to 
mean zero and standard deviation one, the standard deviation in teacher quality has the natural 
interpretation of the bonus in annual student growth obtained for a teacher at the 84
th percentile 
of teachers compared to an average teacher (or the detriment of having a teacher at the 16
th 
percentile compared to the average).  The district wide estimate of the overall standard deviation 
in teacher effectiveness, even when regression adjusted for student demographic characteristics, 
equals 0.17.  Note also that this is fifty percent larger than the regression adjusted within-school-
grade-year standard deviation estimate of 0.11. The estimate of 0.11 is in line with existing 
estimates in the literature of within-school differences in effectiveness.
15
                                                 
14 McCaffrey, Sass, Lockwood, and Mihaly (2009b) analyze the intertemporal stability of teacher effects in detail 
and show that the estimates become even more consistent if additional years are added. 
  We tend to emphasize 
the more conservative within-school estimates, because they guard against unmeasured selection 
into schools by students, teachers, and administrators.  But, if there are distinct quality 
15 Recent reports of estimated effects of a one standard deviation change in teacher quality on achievement include 
0.11 (Rockoff (2004)), 0.13 (Aaronson, Barrow, and Sander (2007)), and 0.22 (Kane and Staiger (2008)).  See the 
summary and interpretation of results in Hanushek and Rivkin (2010).   17 
differences in teachers across schools – say, because of a set of principals that is adept at staffing 
their schools with high quality teachers – the within-school estimator will neglect an important 
component of the teacher quality variance.
16
B. Sorting Among Classrooms  
  It is interesting that the measured selection factors 
found in the inclusion of student demographic characteristics leads to relatively small changes in 
the estimated variation of teacher effectiveness. 
Despite the elimination of any between school variation in teacher quality and of changes 
over time in the quality of instruction for a given teacher and of influences of random shocks or 
error, the within-school-grade-year estimates may be biased. On the one hand, if principals 
assign more cooperative or more engaged students to better teachers, the differential could 
conflate true differences in quality with any student influences for which the empirical model 
does not account fully. On the other hand, compensatory assignment of better students to less 
effective teachers would bias downward estimates of the within-school-grade-year variance. 
We account more fully for any such biases introduced by sorting through the 
identification of two samples of school-grade-year combinations for which the hypotheses either 
of no significant differences among teachers’ classes in average prior year achievement or of 
independence between prior year and current year teacher assignments cannot be rejected at the 
five percent level.  The first approach follows in the spirit of Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor (2006) 
and is based on an F-test of the equality of mean prior year test score; the second approach uses a 
chi-square test to examine the transitions of students who remain in the same school from grade 
g-1 to grade g. The schools observations where we reject the null hypothesis are considered 
observations affected by purposeful sorting (“sorted”,) and all other schools are classified as “not 
                                                 
16 These estimates all come from a single urban district.  If there are important teacher quality differences across 
districts, the overall variation in teacher quality would be commensurately larger.   18 
sorted”.
17
  The top panel of Table 2 reports estimates for two different samples determined by tests 
of differences among classrooms in mean pretest score. Estimates in Columns 2 and 4 are 
generated from the sample of school-grade-year combinations in which “not-sorted” allocation 
of students among teachers was not be rejected at the 5 percent level; estimates in Columns 1 and 
3 are generated from the sample of school-grade-year combinations for which the hypothesis of 
equal classroom pretest means is rejected.  All estimates include the demographic measures 
listed in Table 1.  For the “not-sorted” sample, the within-school-grade-year estimated variance 
of teacher quality equals 0.011 which means that a one standard deviation difference in teacher 
quality translates to a 0.103 standard deviation gain in achievement. This is roughly 10 percent 
smaller than the full sample estimate of 0.113 reported in Table 1. 
  
  The bottom panel repeats the estimation for samples determined by chi-square tests of the 
independence of the current and prior allocation of students to teachers within each school.
18
  The “not sorted” sample results provide a prima facie case for the existence of substantial 
within-school variation in teacher value-added that is not an artifact of classroom sorting.  But, at 
  
The estimated within school-grade-year standard deviation of teacher quality for the “not sorted” 
sample equals 0.098 standard deviations of achievement, essentially identical to the estimate 
reported in the top panel. Thus, these two alternative ways of defining samples where student 
sorting seems less important yield estimates of the within school-grade-year variance in teacher 
quality that are very similar to those found in the full sample. 
                                                 
17 Appendix Table a1 describes the joint distribution of the distribution of schools into “sorted” and “not sorted” 
categories on the basis of these two criteria and illustrates that there is substantial but incomplete agreement in the 
divisions.  Approximately three-quarters of the common schools fall into the same category of sorted or not-sorted, 
but, because of the sample loss from the tests of placements across years, only one-quarter of the schools are found 
at the intersection of the two criteria. 
18 Doing this test requires three consecutive grades – years 1 and 2 for estimation of the teacher-by-year fixed effects 
and a prior year that is used to test for sorting of students.  Therefore, the samples for estimation under this sample 
stratification are just 38-45 percent as large as those used in the top portion.   19 
the same time they do not rule out the possibility that unobserved factors confound the estimates. 
In order to provide additional evidence we conduct falsification tests similar to those suggested 
by Rothstein (2010).  The underlying idea is to estimate basic teacher value-added models such 
as those in Table 2 except to apply information about the subsequent year’s teacher for each 
student rather than the current year’s teacher.  The intuition is that a future teacher cannot affect 
current year performance, so finding a similar distribution of teacher value-added for future 
teachers would raise serious doubts about the estimation strategy.
19
  Importantly, evidence of systematic differences among future teachers in prior year 
value-added is evidence of sorting on the basis of prior grade achievement but not evidence that 
the fixed effect estimates are biased since they explicitly hold prior year achievement constant. 
Nevertheless, if we divide the sample into “sorted” and “not sorted” schools on the basis of 
classroom allocation in the subsequent year, we would expect the subsequent year teacher to 
explain little variation in current year achievement for schools in the “not sorted” category.  
   
  Table 3 presents estimates of the variance and standard deviation of teacher value-added 
for both the actual and subsequent year teacher. For both ways of defining the sample of “not-
sorted schools”, the within-school-grade-year variance estimates and adjacent year correlations 
for future teachers are much smaller than those for current teachers. Based on the differences in 
lagged achievement sorting test (top panel), the estimated within school variance of future 
teacher quality is roughly half as large as the estimated variance of actual teacher quality (0.0026 
versus 0.012).   With the test based on year-to-year transitions, in the not-sorted schools there is a 
much smaller unadjusted variance for effectiveness based on future teachers compared to actual 
                                                 
19 Finding that future teachers are correlated with current performance does not establish bias, because a policy of 
sorting on entry achievement would produce exactly this.  Assume that each year students are placed into classes 
based on their beginning of the year achievement.  Then student in an effective grade G class would tend to be 
placed together in grade G+1, and it would look like the grade G+1 teacher is effective.  The same would hold for an 
ineffective grade G class.     20 
teachers and a small negative correlation for adjacent year performance of these teachers. Not 
surprisingly, in the “sorted” sample the within-school variance estimates for future teachers 
range from 40 to 70 percent as large as the estimates using the actual teachers.
20
  Interestingly, our preferred within-school estimates for the not-sorted sample are quite 
similar to those reported in Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005), a study that used grade level 
aggregate data to circumvent the problem of within-school sorting.  This consistency across very 
different estimation methods despite the challenges of directly measuring teacher productivity 
provides strong support for the belief that there is significant variation in productivity. 
 
V. Teacher Transitions and Productivity 
  The finding of sizeable variation in teacher effectiveness is consistent with the belief that 
teacher transitions substantially alter the distribution of teacher quality from what it would be in 
the absence of such turnover. Given that teachers initiate the vast majority of job separations, 
teacher movement would arguably improve the well-being of most school leavers, even those 
who choose to leave the profession entirely. Yet the implications for schools are uncertain and 
depend upon the factors that induce departures and ultimately on the productivity of school 
leavers and their replacements. As noted earlier, the constrained labor markets for teachers – 
with strict district salary schedules that vary only modestly across districts – may lead the 
dynamics of the teacher labor market to diverge sharply from those of less fettered markets. The 
fact that much of the movement involves changes across the “establishments” of a single firm 
(district) in a context in which teachers typically maintain significant control over assignment to 
open positions introduces another dimension through which the choice process can lead to 
                                                 
20 The analysis in Rothstein (2010) was more dramatic, where the variance in “future teacher quality” looked very 
close to the variance of actual teacher quality.  A significant portion of this, however, results from not correcting for 
measurement error in the value-added estimates.   21 
substantial inequality in teacher effectiveness among both districts and schools. 
   In this section we describe differences in teacher effectiveness by transition status and 
other school and teacher factors. We rely on similar specifications to those estimated in the prior 
section except that transition dummies replace the teacher fixed effects. Again we estimate a 
range of specifications in order to address potential problems introduced by purposeful sorting. 
In addition, we compare estimates based on achievement in the year immediately preceding the 
move with estimates based on achievement in the previous year in order to distinguish between 
temporary and longer term differences in teacher effectiveness. Finally, the pattern of teacher 
transitions is permitted to differ by average student achievement in the school and by the 
proportion of students who are black – factors previously identified as related to the likelihood of 
teacher exits and the degree of harm caused by teacher departures. 
  Teacher movement is substantial within the Lone Star district. As shown in Table 4, 
among new teachers (0-1 years of experience), the annual exit rate from Texas public schools is 
12 percent.  Another 11 percent change campuses, and 7 percent move to another Texas district. 
Even among more experienced teachers, however, some 18 percent still leave their current 
school each year.  The key issue is not, however, the magnitude of the movement per se but 
instead how teacher quality is related to these transitions.
21
A. Overall Differences by Transition 
 
  Table 5 reports regression estimates of mean differences in value-added to mathematics 
achievement by transition (compared to teachers who stay in the same school). These estimates 
provide little or no evidence that more effective teachers have higher probabilities of exiting the 
Lone Star District regardless of their destination. In fact those who exit the Texas public schools 
                                                 
21 It might be plausible to think that the quality of a school is linked to the stability of its teaching force.  The limited 
direct evidence on this, however, does not suggest this is the case after allowing for other factors correlated with the 
rate of teacher turnover; see Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005).   22 
entirely are significantly less effective on average than those who stay regardless of whether they 
are compared to all stayers in the district or only those in the same school, grade, and year. In the 
school year immediately prior to leaving the Texas Public Schools, the average value-added of a 
teacher who exited the Texas public schools entirely was 0.06 standard deviations below the 
average for a teacher remaining in the same school. Moreover, those who switched campuses 
within the same district were also significantly less effective than stayers, though the deficit is 
smaller than that observed for those exiting the Texas public schools. In contrast, those switching 
to another Texas school district were not significantly different on average from teachers who 
remained in the same school.
22
  The mean differences, however, offer a limited view of the character of transitions, 
because there is substantial quality variation in the all streams. Figures 1 and 2 provide kernel 
density plots of teacher value-added that illustrate both the mean differences and dispersion of 
each of the streams in terms of teacher quality. Although non-persistent factors certainly inflate 
the dispersion for all streams, the magnitude of the observed variation clearly indicates 
substantial productivity differences among stayers, school changers and those who exit the 
public schools. 
 
  The transition estimates presented do not allow for any possible interaction with student 
sorting (and thus potential biases in the teacher quality estimates).  Table 6 divides schools into 
sorted and not-sorted based on the two approaches described earlier.  In general, the quality 
differences of teachers switching to a different campus and teachers exiting from Texas public 
schools are clearer and more significant in the not-sorted samples where any possible biases are 
                                                 
22 Another sensitivity check we examined was whether the relationship with prior achievement was linear.  A series 
of indicator variables for different levels of prior achievement, which allow a very flexible relationship, produced 
virtually indistinguishable estimates of effectiveness for the different transition groups – leading us to continue with 
the linear specification in the analyses below.   23 
lessened.  The lower effectiveness of those exiting teaching is particularly noticeable in the not-
sorted samples, being always estimated as having value-added of 0.1-0.15 standard deviations of 
student achievement below those who stay.  These estimates are statistically significant 
regardless of the comparison group or of the method of defining sorted schools.  It is also 
interesting to compare these estimates to the average lower performance on first year teachers, 
typically estimated at about 0.10 (Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005)).  If these exiting teachers 
are replaced with rookie teachers, the expected net effect is close to zero. 
  The high transition rate of teachers early in the career magnifies the importance of the 
pattern of movement for this group, and we now focus on teachers with fewer than four years of 
experience. Table 7 reports mean value-added differences by transition type and single year of 
experience for teachers with one, two, and three years of experience. The much smaller numbers 
of teachers at each experience level lead to quite imprecise estimates, particularly for teachers 
with two and three years of experience. Nonetheless, the results suggest some marked 
differences between first year teachers who remain in teaching and those with more than one 
year of prior experience. Specifically, the first year teachers who change schools are significantly 
more effective on average than stayers, regardless of whether the destination school is located in 
the same district or a different district.  In contrast, those with more experience who switch 
schools or districts are uniformly less effective than those who stay in the school, although many 
of the point estimates are not statistically different from zero and the hypothesis of no difference 
between the coefficients for teachers in their first year and others is not rejected at conventional 
significance levels for any of the three transition types. 
  In contrast, there appears to be relatively little variation across all experience categories, 
including new teachers, in the average effectiveness of teachers who exit the public schools: on   24 
average they are less effective than those staying. Note that we cannot ascertain which of these 
exits result from the decision to pursue other opportunities, which result from the realization that 
one is ineffective, or which result from administrator pressure. Nonetheless, the evidence does 
not support the belief that such turnover adversely affects the composition of teachers. 
B. Differences by Student Demographic Composition 
  Despite the absence of evidence that more productive teachers are more likely to leave 
schools on average, it remains possible that such job adjustments adversely affect lower 
performing schools serving high concentrations of disadvantaged students. As noted, past 
research has shown that schools serving disadvantaged populations have higher turnover.  By 
implication, these schools will have more inexperienced teachers because teachers who leave 
tend to be replaced by new teachers and that by itself would potentially signal lower quality.  
Beyond that, differential reactions to uncompensated working conditions could also affect the 
overall quality distribution of teachers in schools serving disadvantaged populations. 
   To address whether the transition patterns differ by school characteristics, we divide the 
schools into two equal sized categories on the basis first of initial achievement and second of the 
proportion of students who are nonblack.
23
  The estimates in Table 8 provide little support for the view that turnover exerts a higher 
cost on schools with lower performing students or higher black enrollment. To the contrary, the 
estimates indicate that teachers who depart low achieving or low proportion nonblack schools are 
less effective on average relative to stayers than those who depart higher achieving or higher 
  We then examine quality differences by transition 
and student characteristics for all teachers and separately by initial years of experience. 
                                                 
23 Information on eligibility for a subsidized lunch provides a crude measure of income, and our earlier work on 
teacher mobility suggested that black concentration and not overall minority concentration was most salient for 
teacher moves (Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2004)).  Therefore, we concentrate on proportion black, and classify 
schools by proportion nonblackin order to align this and the achievement variables.   25 
proportion nonblack schools. This pattern holds for all transitions, though the difference across 
school categories is statistically significant only for those moving to another school within the 
district. Notice that this pattern holds regardless of whether the comparison group of teachers is 
defined by the district or the specific school, grade, and year. 
  Table 9 reports the same coefficients for first year teachers, and, if anything, the 
estimates provide even less evidence of disproportionate harm to low achieving or high 
proportion black schools. (Estimates for second, third, and fourth year teachers show little 
pattern and are rarely significant). The value-added differential between campus switchers and 
stayers relative to other teachers in the same grade, year, and school equals 0.133 for higher 
achievement schools and 0.018 for lower achievement schools; the same pattern holds if schools 
are divided by proportion non-black. 
  In the case of exits there appears to be little average difference in productivity between 
those who exit and stayers in higher achieving schools, while in lower achieving schools those 
who exit are significantly less effective teachers on average (the coefficient is -0.12 in both 
specifications). A qualitatively similar but far smaller and insignificant differential appears if 
schools are divided by proportion black. 
  In contrast to the other transitions, little consistent pattern emerges for district switchers. 
If effectiveness is measured relative to teachers in the same school, grade, and year, there 
appears to be stronger positive selection out of higher achieving schools. However, the 
differential by school achievement reverses if productivity is measured relative to teachers 
throughout the district, and none of these differences are significant at any conventional level. 
Finally, if schools are ranked by proportion non-black, the differences are small and insignificant  
  A related question considers the destination of within district campus switchers: are more   26 
effective teachers more likely to gravitate toward higher achieving schools? Classifying 
transitions by both origin and destination school characteristics (not shown) reveals little or no 
evidence of significant differences by destination school type regardless of the characteristics of  
the origin school and the method of identifying any sorting into classrooms. 
  The basic results about the relative effectiveness of movers paint a clear picture that 
schools with low achievement or by high black concentrations – often the schools that evoke 
particular concern about the adverse consequences of turnover – are not systematically losing 
their best teachers. This holds for new teachers as well as experienced teachers despite some 
differences by experience in the productivity distributions of school leavers.  Perhaps most 
important, teachers who leave the Texas public schools tend to be noticeably less effective than 
the average teacher who does not move, and this holds independent of being a new or 
experienced teacher. Nonetheless, the average quality of movers masks the very significant 
heterogeneity of quality among stayers and among all streams of job and occupational movers.  
C. Sensitivity Analyses 
  The final issue revolves around questions of quality measurement and specifically, 
whether the observed flows are an artifact of measurement problems with teacher quality.  We 
focus first on the possibility of selection bias due to nonrandom allocation to classrooms and 
then consider the question of whether the measured quality differences appear to be persistent or 
transitory. Table 10 reports differences in teacher effectiveness relative to others in the same 
school, grade, and year by transition, student achievement and racial composition, and student 
assignment mechanism; we report results when schools are divided into “sorted” and “not 
sorted” groups on the basis of the anova test of differences by mean classroom pretest scores.
24
                                                 
24 Division by the Chi-squared test of independent transitions produces a qualitatively similar pattern by much 
noisier estimates, not surprising given the much smaller sample. 
   27 
These results indicate that student sorting on unobservables does not produce the observed 
transition patterns. For both the divisions by achievement and proportion nonblack, all 
coefficients are negative for the “not sorted” samples. As above, the results are stronger for the 
lower achievement schools, where teachers exiting the Texas public schools and those moving to 
another district are significantly less productive than stayers.   
  To this point estimates of teacher effectiveness are based on the academic year 
immediately prior to any transition, but this chronology potentially complicates interpretation of 
the results. Are movers less effective in their transition year because they are less skilled 
teachers? Or, because of a negative shock such as an unruly class or bad relationship with a new 
principal that both induces a transition and degrades instructional effectiveness? Or because they 
put forth less effort once they have decided to leave the school? 
  In order to isolate persistent productivity differences, we generate estimates based on 
value-added in the year prior to the transition year and compare those with estimates based on 
the transition year (immediately preceding the move).  For example, we describe the distribution 
of quality for transitions following the 1999 school year with value-added based on average 
student achievement during the 1998 school year, implying that any shocks or change in effort 
related to the transition do not affect the estimates of teacher effectiveness. This approach does 
introduce analytical difficulties, however, because the sample size is significantly reduced by 
eliminating student performance information on the final year taught for each teacher and for all 
who teach only a single year in Lone Star district. 
  Table 11 reports within-school estimates of the effectiveness of departing teachers that 
are based on achievement in both the transition year and the previous year (disaggregated by   28 
school demographic characteristics).
25
  Second, for those who move to another school in the district, the estimated lower 
performance in comparison to stayers does not show up in specifications based on the value-
added in the penultimate year. There appears to be little difference in average teacher 
effectiveness between within-district movers and stayers when assessed by earlier performance, 
suggesting the possibility that negative shocks or changes in effort account for the apparent 
lower average effectiveness observed in the transition year. 
 Two findings stand out in the comparison of performance 
in the exit year and the year prior. First, for those who leave the Texas public schools, the results 
for assessments based on teacher performance in the penultimate year tend to exceed in 
magnitude estimates based on the transitions year though they follow a similar pattern in that the 
differentials are larger for teachers in low achievement and low proportion nonblack schools. In 
the case of lower achievement schools, the exit-stayer differential is -0.094 based on the 
penultimate year and. -0.061 based on the transition year; in the lower proportion 
nonblackschools the corresponding differences are -0.084 and -0.078. 
  These overall findings would be consistent with the notion that self-recognition of not 
being a very effective teacher precipitates exit from the profession, while a temporary negative 
shock precipitates a transition to another school.  But it is also consistent simply with principal 
pressure on ineffective teachers to leave, a possibility that has not been well-analyzed or 
documented.  These alternative explanations clearly point to different potential policy actions, 
but within our current data it is impossible to distinguish between them. 
  If the difference in estimated effectiveness based for transition year and prior year 
assessments are the result of adverse shocks in the transition year, one might expect average 
                                                 
25 Note that, although the point estimates for the current scores in comparisons across the district (not shown)  differ 
some from the comparable estimates in Table 8 that use the entire sample, the patterns are qualitatively the same.   29 
improvements in effectiveness following a move to a new school. For example, in surveys 
teachers often cite school leader quality as an important determinant of working conditions; if 
teachers move within the district to find a better match with leadership, teacher effectiveness 
might be expected to rise following a move. 
  Table 12 provides estimates of the average change in estimated effectiveness for those 
staying in their prior school and those who switch schools within the Lone Star District. The 
pattern across all teachers indicates that the change in effectiveness of switchers relative to others 
in the district or to others in the same school-grade-year is roughly zero. The effectiveness of 
stayers declines by -0.073 standard deviations relative to others in the district (not significantly 
different from zero) but remains stable relative to others in the same school. Moreover, the 
pattern across new teachers reveals little difference between switchers and stayers and no 
evidence that switchers improve more than stayers relative to either the district or teachers in the 
same school-grade-year. Taken together, the table provides little evidence in support of the view 
that a change of school leads to substantial improvement for many teachers and suggests that job 
switches do not typically lead to more productive matches. 
VI. Conclusions 
  Schools with high concentrations of low income, low achieving, and heavily minority 
populations often experience a great deal of teacher turnover, but the evidence in this paper does 
not support the view that teacher exits adversely affect the quality of education in such schools. 
Rather the pattern of estimates supports the conception of jobs as experience goods in which 
workers learn about their productivity. Less productive teachers appear to be more likely to leave 
lower-achievement, urban schools, either by transitioning to another school in the district or 
exiting the Texas public schools entirely.   30 
A.   Methodological Issues 
  The results depend fundamentally on the validity of the measurement of productivity. 
The constraints of teacher contracts imply that price information is uninformative about quality 
movements, leading us directly to estimate teacher effectiveness based on growth in achievement 
of each teacher’s students.  This estimation is complicated, however, by the myriad choices made 
by families, teachers, and administrators that determine the matching of teachers and students in 
classrooms. In addition, the tests provide noisy measures of achievement, and the measurement 
error can inflate estimates of the variance in teacher effectiveness. 
    The fundamental empirical specification for productivity measurement employs models 
with lagged achievement that implicitly incorporate past influences on learning, while also 
permitting estimation of the importance of depreciation of prior knowledge.   We then use the 
time pattern of student placement across classrooms to separate a sample of schools where 
sorting appears significant versus those were it does not.  Although measurement error from the 
underlying achievement tests will propagate into the value-added measures of teachers, we focus 
on the persistent impacts across years to give the stable part of teacher quality differences.  
Importantly, the estimates of teacher quality from the “not-sorted” samples show significant 
variations in the quality of instruction that are quite consistent with estimates obtained from a 
very different approach not susceptible to bias introduced by sorting into classrooms on 
unobservables or test measurement error. Falsification tests that compare actual teacher value-
added to an estimate based on the students’ future teachers reinforce the validity of the estimates.   
  The measures of teacher effectiveness are employed to trace the impacts of mobility on 
school quality, but the impact could be misstated for reasons related to the move.  A school 
transition could itself be the result of a particularly difficult class, or the performance of the   31 
teacher could be atypically poor because of a lack of effort by the teacher after deciding to move.  
In either case, classroom outcomes in the year prior to a move may not be indicative of the true 
underlying quality of the teacher.  Average quality estimates for teachers exiting Texas schools 
are, however, unaffected by basing the estimate quality from the year before the year of a move 
decision, an estimate that is less prone to reflecting such temporary circumstances. 
B.   Policy Implications 
  Many policy discussions are based on the belief that low achieving schools tend to lose 
many of their best teachers to other schools and professions. In combination with a high level of 
turnover which leads to large numbers of inexperienced teachers in such schools, such teacher 
transitions would imply that the job matching process hinders improving low achieving schools. 
  Our estimates, however, provide little or no support for the belief that those who 
transition out of Lone Star schools in general and out of the lower achieving subset of schools in 
particular are more effective on average than stayers. In fact teachers in low achievement schools 
who exit teaching altogether tend to be far less effective on average than stayers, and the average 
quality difference is quite similar to the return to the first year of experience. Thus the increase in 
average quality of instruction resulting from the departure of less effective teachers roughly 
offsets the decrease resulting from disproportionate reliance on inexperienced teachers.   
Moreover, these conclusions do not appear to be driven by biases in teacher quality estimates 
caused by the pattern of student sorting among classrooms. 
  The entire market appears to be one where employer choices are highly constrained.  
Salaries are effectively not used to induce desirable moves; there are generally weak 
performance evaluations before tenure, which is frequently awarded very quickly in a career; 
employers have often bargained away their ability to assign teachers to specific schools; and   32 
mobility does not on average lead to more productive job matches.  These elements of the 
teacher labor market suggest that the preferences for job location by the teacher are key to 
determining the outcomes of mobility.  This set of observations and conclusions suggests that the 
mobility that occurs in teacher labor markets does not lead to efficiency improvements that 
parallel those in more general labor markets in the economy.   Moreover, the opposite is also 
true.  Simply lessening the aggregate flows of teachers, as is frequently suggested, would not 
yield large improvements in the quality of teachers in schools predominantly serving 
disadvantaged populations. 
  This leads back to the wide variation in effectiveness of teachers both staying and leaving 
schools.  The relatively small average differences in average effectiveness by mobility stream 
compared to the wide differences in quality found among both stayers and leavers indicates that 
changing the effectiveness of teachers in schools serving disadvantaged populations  will likely 
require more direct actions related to the actual effectiveness of teachers. 
  These findings do not resolve all of the interpretive or policy questions, because we 
cannot distinguish among alternative underlying mechanisms that are consistent with these 
patterns of teacher transition.  For example, our estimates of the average effectiveness of teachers 
exiting from Texas public schools could combine exits resulting from the identification and 
removal of poor performing teachers by principals with voluntary choices of teachers who 
recognize that they are not effective in the classroom.  But, more importantly, the lower average 
effectiveness of leavers could combine the effects of some better than average teachers who 
choose to leave for other jobs with another group of ineffective teachers who are forced to leave. 
In the absence of information on the circumstances of the separation it is not possible to quantify 
the relative quality of voluntary leavers versus existing active policies.   33 
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 Table 1. Estimated Variance in Teacher Quality  
 
 














         
variance in fixed effects – var( ) τ    0.120  0.111  0.040  0.038 
adjacent year correlation – r12  0.269  0.244  0.348  0.339 
variance in teacher quality –var( ) τ   0.032  0.027  0.014  0.013 
stnd. dev. in teacher quality – τ σ   0.180  0.165  0.118  0.113 
 
Note: Teacher fixed effects are produced from regressions of math score on lagged math score. 
Specifications with demographic characteristics also include indicators for female, race-
ethnicity, low income, limited English proficient, special needs, first year in middle 
school, and family initiated school change.  Number of observations is 254,046.Table 2. Estimated Variance in Teacher Quality by Alternative Tests of 
Significant Classroom Sorting 
 
 
  within district  within school and grade 
  sorted  not-sorted  sorted  not-sorted 
1. Sorting Tested by Pretest Mean 
Achievement         
variance in fixed effects – var( ) τ    0.092  0.146  0.040  0.042 
adjacent year correlation – r12  0.425  0.283  0.496  0.254 
variance in teacher quality –var( ) τ   0.039  0.041  0.020  0.011 
stnd. dev. in teacher quality – τ σ   0.198  0.203  0.141  0.103 
         
Observations  161,990  79,047  161,990  79,047 
         
2.  Sorting Tested by Classroom Assignment Patterns   
variance in fixed effects – var( ) τ    0.081  0.116  0.034  0.036 
adjacent year correlation – r12  0.411  0.274  0.422  0.265 
variance in teacher quality –var( ) τ   0.033  0.032  0.014  0.010 
stnd. dev. in teacher quality – τ σ   0.182  0.178  0.120  0.098 
         
Observations  56,656  24,010  56,656  24,010 
 
 
Note: Fixed effects derived from regressions that include lagged test score and the demographic 
variables listed in Table 1.Table 3. Estimated Variance in Teacher Quality for Actual and Subsequent Grade Teachers and Alternative 
Tests of Classroom Sorting 
 
 
  within district  within school and grade 


















1. Sorting Tested by Pretest Mean Achievement               
variance in fixed effects – var( ) τ    0.098  0.093  0.170  0.135  0.042  0.038  0.053  0.023 
adjacent year correlation – r12  0.264  0.180  0.151  0.078  0.440  0.174  0.219  0.111 
variance in teacher quality –var( ) τ   0.026  0.017  0.026  0.011  0.018  0.0066  0.012  0.0026 
stnd. dev. in teacher quality – τ σ   0.161  0.129  0.160  0.103  0.136  0.081  0.108  0.051 
                 
Observations  56,051  56,051  23,172  23,172  56,051  56,051  23,172  23,172 
                 
2.  Sorting Tested by Classroom Assignment Patterns             
variance in fixed effects – var( ) τ    0.096  0.088  0.169  0.146  0.044  0.036  0.049  0.025 
adjacent year correlation – r12  0.343  0.372  0.157  0.114  0.443  0.382  0.325  -0.083 
variance in teacher quality –var( ) τ   0.033  0.033  0.027  0.017  0.019  0.014  0.016   
stnd. dev. in teacher quality – τ σ   0.181  0.181  0.163  0.129  0.140  0.117  0.126   
                 




  All  New Teachers 
Stay at same campus  0.81  0.70 
Change campus  0.09  0.11 
Change district  0.04  0.07 
Exit Texas public schools  0.06  0.12 
     
Observations (Teacher/Years)  7589  801 
   
 
 
Table 5.  Average Differences in Teacher Quality by Transition Compared to 
Teachers Who Do Not Move 
 
Teacher mobility  within district  within school and grade 
change campus  -0.048  -0.027 
  (3.64)  (2.49) 
change district  0.019  -0.019 
  (0.99)  (1.26) 
exit Texas public schools  -0.058  -0.061 
  (3.79)  (5.24) 
 
Note: Coefficients on teacher transition variables come from regressions of math score on the 
transition variables plus lagged score, indicators for female, race-ethnicity, low income, special 
needs, limited English proficient, first year in middle school, family initiated move, shares of 
students in campus, grade, and year who are black, Hispanic, Asian, low income, special needs, 
limited English proficient, movers, peer average lagged achievement, a full set of teacher 
experience dummies, and a full set of year-by-grade dummies.  No move is omitted category; 
254,046 observations; absolute value of t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by 
teacher-year in parentheses. 
 
   2 
 
Table 6.  Average Differences in Teacher Quality by Transition Compared to 
Teachers Who Do Not Move by Sorting of Students across Classrooms 
 
  within district  within school and grade 
  sorted  not-sorted  sorted  not-sorted 
1. Sorting Tested by Pretest Mean Achievement 
change campus  -0.043  -0.06  -0.031  -0.015 
  (2.60)  (2.64)  (2.25)  (0.88) 
change district  0.006  0.005  -0.015  -0.034 
  (0.26)  (0.14)  (0.88)  (1.11) 
exit  -0.053  -0.101  -0.045  -0.098 
  (3.05)  (3.84)  (3.16)  (4.93) 
         
Observations  160,939  78,498  160,939  78,498 
         
         
2. Sorting Tested by Classroom Assignment Patterns 
change campus  -0.031  -0.044  -0.014  -0.085 
  (1.17)  (1.01)  (0.65)  (2.50) 
change district  0.06  0.018  0.024  -0.133 
  (1.43)  (0.27)  (0.82)  (3.97) 
exit  -0.052  -0.154  -0.033  -0.136 
  (2.26)  (3.44)  (1.61)  (3.83) 
         
Observations  56,166  24,461  56,166  24,461 Table 7.  Average Differences in Teacher Quality by Transition Type and 
Experience at Time of Move  
 
 
Experience at Move 
change 
campus   
change 
district   
exit public 
schools 
           
following 1st year  0.062    0.067    -0.049 
  (1.97)    (1.79)    (1.66) 
following 2nd year  -0.019    -0.057    -0.020 
  (0.45)    (1.46)    (0.58) 
following 3rd year  -0.048    -0.032    -0.057 
  (1.57)    (0.89)    (1.68) 
following 4th+ years  -0.040    -0.031    -0.070 
  (3.23)    (1.66)    (4.89) 
  
 
Note:  Within school comparisons; no move is omitted category; regressions from same sample and 
use same specifications as those in Table 4; absolute value of t-statistics based on robust standard 





School demographics based on 
average achievement 
School demographics based on 














change campus         
  from low value  school  -0.081  -0.062  -0.070  -0.055 
    (4.51)  (4.35)  (3.89)  (3.40) 
  from high value school  -0.013  0.006  -0.027  -0.003 
    (0.72)  (0.40)  (1.48)  (0.22) 
   Difference (F)
b  7.24  10.63  3.01  5.38 
change district         
  from low value  school  -0.003  -0.033  0.010  -0.028 
    (0.09)  (1.53)  (0.17)  (1.16) 
  from high value school  0.041  -0.008  0.028  -0.015 
  (1.66)  (0.41)  (1.14)  (0.80) 
   Difference (F)
b  1.38  0.76  0.34  0.19 
exit public schools         
  from low value  school  -0.081  -0.086  -0.066  -0.082 
    (3.76)  (5.25)  (2.62)  (4.16) 
  from high value school  -0.037  -0.043  -0.055  -0.051 
   (1.80)  (2.79)  (3.05)  (3.75) 
   Difference (F)
b  2.18  3.68  0.12  1.69 
 
Notes: 
a.  Schools divided by being above or below district average for student achievement or percent black; no move is omitted 
category; no move is omitted category; 251,943 observations; same variables as in Table 4 specifications; absolute value of 
t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by teacher-year in parentheses.   
b. F-statistic for difference between high and low value school.  Degrees of freedom for achievement are F(1,7588) and for 
Proportion Black are F(1,7588).  Difference that are significant at the 5 percent level in bold.   2 
Table 9.  Average Differences in First Year Teacher Quality by Transition Type and 
Student Characteristics in School 
 
 
School demographics based on 
average achievement 
School demographics based on 














change campus         
  from low value  school  -0.038  0.018  -0.033  0.008 
    (0.78)  (0.51)  (0.56)  (0.19) 
  from high value school  0.036  0.133  -0.001  0.106 
    (0.42)  (2.28)  (0.01)  (2.79) 
   Difference (F)
b  0.59  2.95  0.17  2.94 
change district         
  from low value  school  0.107  0.034  0.082  0.073 
    (2.06)  (0.67)  (1.39)  (1.23) 
  from high value school  0.064  0.114  0.098  0.051 
  (1.00)  (2.37)  (1.93)  (1.73) 
   Difference (F)
b  0.29  1.35  0.05  0.11 
exit public schools         
  from low value  school  -0.127  -0.120  -0.084  -0.061 
    (2.99)  (3.49)  (1.58)  (1.47) 
  from high value school  -0.010  0.033  -0.077  -0.050 
   (0.22)  (0.97)  (2.20)  (1.51) 
   Difference (F)
b  4.00  10.87  0.01  0.05 
 
Notes: 
a.  Schools divided by being above or below district average for student achievement or percent black; no move is 
omitted category; no move is omitted category; 251,943 observations; same variables as in Table 4 specifications; 
absolute value of t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by teacher-year in parentheses.   
b.  F-statistic for difference between high and low value schools for first year teachers.  Degrees of freedom for 
achievement are F(1,7588) and for Proportion Black are F(1,7588).  Difference that are significant at the 5 percent 
level in bold.Table 10. Differences in Teacher Quality by Transition and Distribution of 
Students Among Classrooms  
 
  Average achievement  Proportion nonblack students 
  sorted  not-sorted  sorted  not-sorted 
change campus         
  from low value  school  -0.076  -0.028  -0.064  -0.036 
  (4.36)  (1.12)  (3.00)  (1.50) 
  from high value  school  0.012  -0.004  -0.010  0.021 
  (0.58)  (0.18)  (0.56)  (0.87) 
change district         
  from low value  school  -0.022  -0.087  -0.023  -0.057 
  (0.92)  (1.98)  (0.86)  (0.96) 
  from high value  school  -0.011  0.003   -0.012  -0.023 
  (0.51)  (0.08)  (0.56)  (0.69) 
exit public schools         
  from low value  school  -0.065  -0.139  -0.072  -0.108 
  (3.28)  (4.76)  (2.97)  (3.22) 
  from high value  school  -0.035  -0.054  -0.035  -0.085 
  (1.83)  (2.09)  (2.11)  (3.63) 
         
Observations  159,569  77,939  159,569  77,939 
 
Note: Within-school comparisons; no move is omitted category; classification of classroom allocation 
mechanism based on classroom differences in prior achievement; same variables as regression 
specifications used in Table 4; absolute value of t-statistics based on robust standard errors 
clustered by teacher-year in parentheses.  Table 11. Differences in Teacher Quality by Transition, School Characteristics, 
and Timing of Quality Estimate  
 










change campus         
  from low value  school  0.002  -0.064  0.014  -0.059 
  (0.08)  (3.13)  (0.70)  (2.79) 
  from high value  school  0.003  -0.026  -0.010  -0.029 
  (0.15)  (1.34)  (0.43)  (1.47) 
change district         
  from low value  school  -0.014  -0.008  -0.005  0.008 
  (0.47)  (0.22)  (0.16)  (0.24) 
  from high value  school  -0.001  0.012  -0.010  -0.003 
  (0.06)  (0.43)  (0.44)  (0.10) 
exit public schools         
  from low value  school  -0.094  -0.061  -0.084  -0.078 
  (3.76)  (2.61)  (3.34)  (3.03) 
  from high value  school  -0.014  -0.054  -0.025  -0.043 
  (0.75)  (2.90)  (1.34)  (2.35) 
 
Note: Within-school comparisons; no move is omitted category; classification of classroom allocation 
mechanism based on classroom differences in prior achievement; same variables as regression 
specifications used in Table 4; 162,060 observations; absolute value of t-statistics based on 
robust standard errors clustered by teacher-year in parentheses.  Table 12. Average year to year change in value-added over adjacent year for 








comparisons  observations 
all teachers       
  same campus  -0.073  0.006  4,305 
  new campus  0.003*  -0.002  205 
       
0 or 1 yr experience       
  same campus  0.022  0.056  517 
  new campus  0.015  0.023  31 
 
 
*reject hypothesis of no difference by transition status at 0.05 level 








 Appendix Table a1.  Correspondence Between Assignment into Sorted and Not-
sorted categories by Test Statistic 
 
 
  F Test of Mean Pretest Score Difference 
Chi Squared Test of Transitions    sorted  unsorted  missing  Total 
a.   Proportions           
Sorted    0.71  0.29  0.00  0.13 
Unsorted    0.27  0.73  0.00  0.10 
missing     0.37  0.38  0.25  0.77 
           
Total    0.40  0.40  0.19  1.0 
           
b.   Numbers (School/grade/year)    sorted  unsorted  missing  Total 
Sorted    290  116  0  406 
Unsorted    86  235  0  321 
missing     879  899  600  2378 
           
Total    1255  1250  600  3105 
 
 
Note:  The Chi Square test of the independence of transitions across grades requires an additional year of data with at least 
two teachers in the grade, leading to the classification of missing for a number of observations. 